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Five studies established that normal narcissism is correlated with good psychological health. Specifically,
narcissism is (a) inversely related to daily sadness and dispositional depression, (b) inversely related to daily
and dispositional loneliness, (c) positively related to daily and dispositional subjective well-being as well as
couple well-being, (d) inversely related to daily anxiety, and (e) inversely related to dispositional neuroticism.
More important, self-esteem fully accounted for the relation between narcissism and psychological health.
Thus, narcissism is beneficial for psychological health only insofar as it is associated with high self-esteem.
Explanations of the main and mediational findings in terms of response or social desirability biases (e.g.,
defensiveness, repression, impression management) were ruled out. Supplementary analysis showed that the
links among narcissism, self-esteem, and psychological health were preponderantly linear.
The subclinical narcissistic personality is currently attracting
keen theoretical and empirical interest (Rhodewalt & Morf, in
press; Sedikides, Campbell, Reeder, Elliot, & Gregg, 2002; Wal-
lace & Baumeister, 2002). Conceptually, researchers have defined
subclinical narcissism in terms of a self-centered, self-
aggrandizing, dominant, and manipulative interpersonal orienta-
tion (Emmons, 1987; Paulhus, 1998; Paulhus & Williams, 2002).
Operationally, they have defined subclinical narcissism as a mul-
tifaceted construct consisting of seven components: autonomy,
entitlement, exhibitionism, exploitation, self-sufficiency, superior-
ity, and vanity (Narcissistic Personality Inventory [NPI]; Raskin &
Hall, 1979, 1981; Raskin & Terry, 1988). The NPI is a self-report
inventory, is based on the definition of narcissism provided by the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3rd ed.;
American Psychiatric Association, 1980), and measures narcissism
on a continuum or as a personality trait (Emmons, 1987). Thus, it
is important to clarify that this research does not address patho-
logical narcissism and, instead, focuses exclusively on persons
with relatively high degrees of narcissism (high or normal narcis-
sists) or with relatively high scores on the NPI.
A Brief Review of Theory and Research on Normal Narcissism
Two complementary views of normal narcissism have been offered
by Paulhus (2001). The first is based on the Big Five framework.
Specifically, the structure of interpersonal traits is represented in terms
of two dimensions: agency and communion (T. Leary, 1957; Wig-
gins, 1979). The vector that diagonally slices the two circumplex axes
of high agency and low communion is regarded as the locus of
narcissism (Wiggins & Pincus, 1994). Subsequent work has con-
firmed the view that narcissists are relatively high on agency and low
on communion (W. K. Campbell, Rudich, & Sedikides, 2002;
Paulhus & John, 1998). Costa and McCrae (1995) related the high-
agency and low-communion axes to the Big Five traits of Extraver-
sion and Agreeableness, arguing that the former were slight rotations
of the latter. On the basis of this insight, Paulhus (2001) labeled high
narcissists “disagreeable extraverts.” The second view of normal
narcissism is based on attachment theory. According to the working
model hypothesis (Griffin & Bartholomew, 1994), attachment styles
are structured around one’s perception of self (positive vs. negative)
and others (positive vs. negative). High narcissists have a positive
perception of self but a negative perception of others, resembling the
attachment style of dismissives.
There is now compelling empirical support for the claim that
normal narcissists love the self abundantly, far more than they love
others. To begin with, narcissism is inversely related to agreeable-
ness, empathy, gratitude, affiliation, and need for intimacy,
whereas it is positively related to competitiveness, exploitative-
ness, Machiavellianism, anger, hostility, and cynical mistrust of
others (Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001; Rhodewalt, 2001; Sedikides,
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Campbell, Reeder, Elliot, & Gregg, 2002). Also, compared with
low narcissists, high narcissists relish direct competition against
others (Morf, Weir, & Davidov, 2000). Furthermore, high narcis-
sists glorify the self, conveniently disregarding the possibility that
their self-promoting tactics constitute a slight against others. For
example, Gabriel, Critelli, and Ee (1994) asked participants to rate
their own intelligence and physical attractiveness in relation to the
average college student. High narcissists overestimated their intel-
ligence and attractiveness, as evidenced both by the results of an
intelligence test and by judges’ ratings of participants’ attractive-
ness. Similarly, John and Robins (1994) examined participants’
evaluations of their positive contribution to a group discussion
task. High narcissists rated their own contribution as more impact-
ful than that of other discussants, a judgment contradicted by
observers and peers. In addition, narcissists are interpersonally
dismissive and abrasive. For example, Kernis and Sun (1994) gave
participants bogus interpersonal feedback. When the feedback was
unfavorable, high narcissists regarded the evaluator as incompetent
and unlikable, an opinion that they were prepared to convey even
in a face-to-face interaction (Morf & Rhodewalt, 1993; Smalley &
Stake, 1996). Moreover, not only do high narcissists derogate
unfavorable evaluators, they also behave aggressively toward them
(Bushman & Baumeister, 1998; Stucke & Sporer, 2002).
High narcissists manifest entitlement behavior at the direct
expense of even close others. Research on the self-serving bias
(SSB) is a case in point. The SSB refers to the tendency to take
credit for success but disavow blame for failure. The SSB is a
robust phenomenon (W. K. Campbell & Sedikides, 1999;
Sedikides & Gregg, 2003), but a rare exception occurs when
participants collaborate on an interdependent (i.e., joint outcomes)
task with a close other. Here, no SSB emerges (Sedikides, Camp-
bell, Reeder, & Elliot, 1998, 2002). However, narcissists display
the SSB even when their partner is a close other (Sedikides,
Campbell, Reeder, & Elliot, 2002). In addition, they derogate close
others who outperform them (Morf & Rhodewalt, 1993). It would
appear that high narcissists self-enhance even at an interpersonal
cost. In fact, they deliberately use close others for self-
enhancement purposes, a tactic labelled “the Others Exist for Me”
illusion by Sedikides, Campbell, Reeder, Elliot, and Gregg (2002).
It is no surprise then that high narcissists are attracted to partners
who express admiration, whereas they are turned off by partners
who offer intimacy (W. K. Campbell, 1999), preferring a game-
playing (“ludic”) love style (W. K. Campbell, Foster, & Finkel,
2002) and showing low commitment to dating relationships (W. K.
Campbell & Foster, 2002).
Normal Narcissism and Psychological Health
Does the high agency–low communion of normal narcissism have
implications for psychological functioning? Does this excessive self-
aggrandizement and interpersonal abrasiveness reflect psychological
maladjustment? Specifically, are high narcissists psychologically
healthy and, if so, why? The objective of the present article is to
address this last question. We are exclusively concerned with self-
reported psychological health, which we define and operationalize in
terms of (a) low levels of depression (or sadness), anxiety, loneliness,
and neuroticism and (b) high levels of subjective and couple well-
being (Gramzow, Sedikides, Panter, & Insko, 2000; John, 1990).
Theory and research in personality and social psychology have
duly entertained the hypothesis that high narcissists are psychologi-
cally unhealthy. Indeed, normal narcissists are empirically portrayed
as persons in psychological turmoil: They report emotional highs and
lows (Bogart, Benotsch, & Pavlovic, 2004; Rhodewalt & Shimoda,
2002); their self-esteem is unstable and highly dependent on their
social interactions (Rhodewalt, in press; Rhodewalt, Madrian, &
Cheney, 1998; see also Kernis, 2001); they are jealous and fearful of
closeness (Rhodewalt & Shimoda, 2002); they are distrusting, suspi-
cious and controlling of others (Davidov & Morf, 2004); they react
angrily (Rhodewalt & Morf, 1998) and aggressively (Bushman &
Baumeister, 1998; Stucke & Sporer, 2002) to threatening feedback;
and they may have implicit self-conceptions of which they are
ashamed (Tracy & Robins, 2003). As such, it is not an exaggeration
to assert that the hypothesis that high narcissists are psychologically
unhealthy forms the current subtext of mainstream personality and
social psychological thinking.
We wish to challenge this hypothesis. To begin with, the data
have not been kind to it. First, there is no evidence that agency per
se (a defining dimension of normal narcissism) is linked to poor
psychological health. On the contrary, agency is associated with
reduced anxiety and depression (Holahan & Spence, 1980) as well
as with higher positive affect, lower negative affect, and higher life
satisfaction (Saragovi, Aube, Koestner, & Zuroff, 2002). In a
similar vein, there is no clear evidence that communion is posi-
tively associated with psychological health. Communion may be
related to positive affect (Saragovi et al., 2002), but it is also
related to distress (Aube, Fichman, Saltaris, & Koestner, 2001).
Perhaps it is extreme levels of agency that are associated with poor
psychological health (Bakan, 1966; Helgeson, 1994). After all, the
devaluation of close relationships on the part of high narcissists ought
to have implications for psychological health. This assertion is backed
by evidence that involvement in close and secure relationships is
linked with psychological health, specifically (a) the relative absence
of anxiety, sadness, depression (House, Landis, & Umberson, 1988;
Mickelson, Kessler, & Shaver, 1997) and loneliness (Marangoni &
Ickes, 1989) and (b) the relative presence of subjective well-being
(Diener, 1984). Once again, however, the data discredit the hypoth-
esis: High narcissists report relatively good psychological health. In
particular, normal narcissism is positively related to subjective well-
being (Rose, 2002), is inversely related to anxiety (Watson & Bider-
man, 1993) and depression (Watson & Biderman, 1993; Wink, 1992),
and is unrelated to loneliness (Joubert, 1986).
Normal Narcissism and Psychological Health: The Role
of Self-Esteem
Why, then, do normal narcissists report good (i.e., high self-
reported) psychological health? We located a possible reason in a
key component of narcissism: level of self-esteem (hereinafter
self-esteem). This construct reflects the value that one places on
the self (Rosenberg, 1965). Self-esteem has been found to be
consistently and positively related to narcissism (W. K. Campbell,
Rudich, & Sedikides, 2002; Emmons, 1984, 1987; Kernis & Sun,
1994; Morf & Rhodewalt, 1993; Raskin, Novacek, & Hogan,
1991; Raskin & Terry, 1988; Rhodewalt & Morf, 1995, 1998;
Rhodewalt et al., 1998). This strong and persistent relation led
Baumeister and Vohs (2001) to characterize narcissism as an
addiction to self-esteem. Importantly, self-esteem is also associ-
ated with psychological health: It is inversely linked to anxiety
(Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987; Tarlow & Haaga, 1996), depres-
sion (Gjerde, Block, & Block, 1988; Tennen & Herzberger, 1987),
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and loneliness (Jones, Freemon, & Goswick, 1981; M. R. Leary &
Baumeister, 2000), and it is positively linked to subjective well-
being (Baumeister, Campbell, Krueger, & Vohs, 2003; DeNeve &
Cooper, 1998).
Consequently, we hypothesized that a critical reason for the link
between normal narcissism and psychological health is self-
esteem. Stated more precisely, our hypothesis is that self-esteem
mediates the relation between narcissism and psychological health.
Self-esteem is a crucial component of narcissism—a component
that is, at least in part, responsible for the relation between nar-
cissism and good psychological health. We are concerned with the
mediational role of both global trait self-esteem (Pliner, Chaiken,
& Flett, 1990; Rosenberg, 1965) and domain-specific trait self-
esteem. For theoretically relevant reasons, we also considered two
esteem domains: self-competence and self-liking (Tafarodi &
Milne, 2002; Tafarodi & Swann, 1995). It is plausible, for exam-
ple, that the self-esteem of narcissists is based on self-competence
(i.e., derived from agency) rather than self-liking (i.e., derived
from communion) and, as such, self-competence esteem would be
a more potent mediator of the association between narcissism and
psychological health than self-liking esteem.
We note that a recent study by Rose (2002) also addressed the
role of self-esteem in narcissism’s predictive utility of psycholog-
ical outcomes. Our investigation, however, differs from Rose’s
study in several important ways. First, the current investigation is
concerned with narcissism, whereas Rose’s study was concerned
with the distinction between overt and covert narcissism (Cooper
& Ronningstam, 1992; Wink, 1991). Second, the current investi-
gation addresses whether self-esteem mediates the relation be-
tween narcissism and multiple indicators of daily and dispositional
psychological health, whereas Rose’s study addressed whether
self-esteem mediates the relation between narcissism and a one-
time measure of dispositional well-being. Third, the current inves-
tigation examined multiple and theory-guided indicators of self-
esteem, thereby enabling several nuances of the hypothesized
mediational link to be tested (Study 5); Rose’s study, in contrast,
only used two near redundant indicators of self-esteem, the Rosen-
berg Self-Esteem Inventory (RSI; Rosenberg, 1965) and the
Single-Item Self-Esteem Scale (Robins, Hendin, & Trzesniewski,
2001). Finally, the current investigation addressed whether the
self-esteem-mediated relation between narcissism and psycholog-
ical health is accounted for by several response biases (i.e., defen-
siveness, repression, and impression management); Rose’s inves-
tigation did not rule out such rival hypotheses.
We conducted five studies. In Study 1, participants completed
one-time measures of narcissism, self-esteem, and psychological
health (i.e., depression, loneliness, and subjective well-being). In
Study 2, participants completed one-time measures of narcissism
and self-esteem, and they subsequently recorded daily their psy-
chological health (i.e., sadness, loneliness, subjective well-being,
and anxiety) for five consecutive days. In Study 3, married couples
completed one-time measures of narcissism, self-esteem, and psy-
chological health (i.e., subjective well-being, couple well-being).
In Study 4, we examined whether response biases (i.e., defensive-
ness and repression) account for the self-esteem-mediated relation
between narcissism and psychological health (i.e., depression,
loneliness, subjective well-being). Finally, in Study 5, we exam-
ined whether another response bias (i.e., impression management)
accounts for the esteem-mediated relation between narcissism and
psychological health (i.e., depression, loneliness, subjective well-
being, anxiety, and neuroticism). In this study, we used four
measures of self-esteem.
Study 1
Method
Participants and Procedure
Participants were 149 (107 women, 42 men) University of North Caro-
lina at Chapel Hill (UNC-CH) students fulfilling an introductory psychol-
ogy course option. Participants were tested in groups of 8–15. They
completed, in random order, measures of narcissism and self-esteem. Next,
they completed, also in random order, two measures of depression, three
(later condensed to two) measures of loneliness, and two measures of
subjective well-being. Debriefing followed.
Measures
Narcissism. Participants completed the 40-item NPI. Its scores range
from 0 to 40, with higher scores reflecting higher narcissism. The NPI
exhibits adequate reliability and validity (Raskin & Terry, 1988). In this
study, scores ranged from 2 to 35 (M  15.8;   .82).
Self-esteem. Participants completed the 10-item RSI, a measure of
global trait self-esteem. RSI scores range from 10 to 90, with higher scores
indicating higher self-esteem. The RSI has adequate reliability and validity
(Fleming & Courtney, 1984). In this study, scores ranged from 28 to 90
(M  72.11;   .88).
Depression. Participants completed two depression scales. One was
the Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-D; Radloff,
1977), a reliable and valid instrument (Radloff, 1977). The CES-D assesses
depression within a nonclinical population by measuring mostly affective
symptoms. The scale consists of 20 items with scores ranging from 0 to 60.
Higher scores indicate more severe depression. In this study, scores ranged
from 0 to 45 (M  16.01;   .91).
The second measure was the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck,
1967). This scale also has high reliability and validity (Steer, Beck, &
Garrison, 1986) and assesses clinical levels of depression by measuring
affective, behavioral, physiological, and cognitive symptoms. The scale
consists of 21 items, with scores ranging from 0 to 63. Scores above 20
reflect severe depression, whereas scores between 14 and 20 reflect mod-
erate depression. In this study, scores ranged from 0 to 33 (M  7.8;  
.88).
Loneliness. Participants completed three measures of loneliness. The
first was the University of California, Los Angeles, Loneliness Scale
(UCLA-LS; Version 3; Russell & Cutrona, 1988), a scale manifesting
adequate reliability and validity (Russell & Cutrona, 1988). The UCLA-LS
consists of 20 items and assesses loneliness that results from discrepancies
between achieved and desired social contact. Scores range from 20 to 80,
with higher scores reflecting more loneliness. In this study, scores ranged
from 21 to 61 (M  41.3;   .92).
The other two loneliness measures were the Emotional Loneliness Scale
(ELS) and Social Loneliness Scale (SLS; Wittenberg, 1986), both demon-
strating adequate reliability and validity (Russell, Cutrona, Rose, & Yurko,
1984). The ELS assesses loneliness that results from the absence of a
satisfying, romantic relationship. In contrast, the SLS assesses loneliness
that results from the absence of satisfying, nonromantic relationships. The
ELS and SLS consist of five items each, with scores ranging from 5 to 25.
Higher scores indicate higher levels of emotional or social loneliness. The
two measures were correlated, r .63, p .001. Thus, we combined them
to form a single index, the Emotional and Social Loneliness Scale (ESLS).
Supplementary data analyses on single scales produced results identical to
the reported ones. Scores on the ESLS ranged from 10 to 38 (M  21.3;
  .79).
Subjective well-being. Participants completed two reliable and valid
subjective well-being scales, the Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS;
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Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985) and the Affect Balance Scale
(ABS; Bradburn, 1969). The 5-item (score range: 5–35) SWLS assesses
global life satisfaction, with higher scores indicating greater life satisfac-
tion. In this study, scores ranged from 5 to 35 (M  25.1;   .88). The
10-item (score range: 0–10) ABS assesses the degree of difference in
positive and negative emotions experienced. Higher scores indicate more
positive affect. In this study, scores ranged from 1 to 10 (M  6.4;  
.49). Note that, although the alpha for the ABS was low, the results for the
two subjective well-being scales were very similar, as discussed later.
Results and Discussion
We hypothesized that self-esteem mediates the relation between
narcissism and psychological health. In testing for mediation, we
followed Baron and Kenny’s (1986) guidelines. First, we regressed
self-esteem on narcissism. This relation was significant (  .34,
p .001), a pattern consistent with past research (W. K. Campbell,
Rudich, & Sedikides, 2002; Emmons, 1987; Rhodewalt et al.,
1998). Second, we regressed each psychological health index on
narcissism. Narcissism predicted psychological health. With re-
gard to depression, narcissism was inversely related both to CES-D
(  –.18, p  .04) and (marginally) BDI (  –.13, p  .10).
These findings replicate past research (Watson & Biderman, 1993;
Wink, 1992). In respect to loneliness, narcissism was inversely
related both to UCLA-LS and ESLS (s  –.30 and –.29, ps 
.001). These findings contradict the single available study on the
topic (Joubert, 1986), which reported a nonsignificant relation
between narcissism and loneliness. In reference to subjective well-
being, narcissism was positively related both to SWLS and ABS
(s  .30 and .24, ps  .01). This result replicates a relevant
finding reported by Rose (2002).
Parenthetically, we also regressed each psychological health
index on self-esteem. With respect to depression, self-esteem was
inversely related both to CES-D and BDI (s  –.58 and –.55,
respectively, ps  .001). With respect to loneliness, self-esteem
was inversely related both to UCLA-LS and ESLS (s  –.51 and
–.40, respectively, ps  .001). With respect to subjective well-
being, self-esteem was positively related both to SWLS and ABS
(s  .59 and .39, respectively, ps  .001). Consistent with past
research (Diener, 1984; Jones et al., 1981; Tennen & Herzberger,
1987), self-esteem predicted psychological health.
The third mediational step was to regress each psychological
health index on narcissism and self-esteem. If self-esteem mediates
the relation between narcissism and emotional distress, this rela-
tion will decrease when self-esteem is entered into the model.
Also, critical mediational evidence would be provided by a sig-
nificant indirect (i.e., through self-esteem) effect1 of narcissism on
psychological health.
Self-esteem completely mediated the effect of narcissism on
depression. When self-esteem was included in the model (CES-D:
  –.55, BDI:   –.61, ps  .001), narcissism was unrelated
both to CES-D ( –.01, p .87) and to BDI ( .07, p .31).
The indirect effects of narcissism on CES-D and BDI were sig-
nificant (zs  3.81 and 3.92, respectively, ps  .01).
Self-esteem partially mediated the effect of narcissism on lone-
liness. When self-esteem was included in the model (UCLA-LS:
  –.46, ESLS:   –.34, ps  .001), the independent effect of
narcissism on loneliness decreased, although narcissism was mar-
ginally related to UCLA-LS (  –.14, p  .07) and was still
significantly related to ESLS (  –.17, p  .04). Nevertheless,
the indirect effects of narcissism on UCLA-LS and ESLS were
significant (zs 3.60 and 3.09, respectively, ps .01). Narcissism
had both a direct and an indirect effect on loneliness.
In addition, self-esteem mediated completely the effect of nar-
cissism on subjective well-being. When self-esteem was entered in
the model (SWLS:   .55, ABS:   .35, ps  .001), narcissism
was unrelated both to SWLS (  .11, p  .12) and to ABS ( 
.12, p  .16). The indirect effects of narcissism on SWLS and
ABS were significant (zs  3.85 and 3.15, respectively, ps  .01).
In summary, the evidence is consistent with the contention that
self-esteem mediates the relation between normal narcissism and
psychological health. It is the self-esteem component of narcissism
that accounts for its positive relations with the psychological
health outcomes.
Study 2
In Study 2, we adopted a time-lagged design: We measured
narcissism and self-esteem in Time 1, while assessing psycholog-
ical health at several subsequent time intervals. We wanted to
know whether narcissism predicts future (rather than concurrent)
psychological health and whether this link is mediated by self-
esteem. Additionally, we added anxiety to the list of psychological
health indexes (Gramzow et al., 2000), thus broadening the scope
of our investigation. Furthermore, we operationalized psycholog-
ical health in an alternative way, in terms of daily reports over a
5-day period.
Method
Participants and Procedure
Participants were 81 (60 women, 21 men) UNC-CH introductory psy-
chology volunteers. They began completing the measures (see below) on
Wednesday and finished on Sunday of the same week. Instructions em-
phasized the importance of daily completion of the measures. Two days
into the study, participants met with the experimenter to return the com-
pleted measures. Again, they were instructed to complete the measures
daily, and they confirmed that so far they had done so. Participants met for
a final time with the experimenter the following week to submit the
remaining measures and be debriefed. At that meeting, participants also
confirmed that they had completed the measures daily.
Measures
Participants completed the NPI (range 3–29; M 16.06;  .80) and
RSI (range  44–89; M  73.07;   .82), embedded in a packet of
unrelated questionnaires. Next, participants were asked to complete a
questionnaire at the end of each day for five consecutive days. This
1 Testing whether an indirect effect (i.e., ab) is significant involved
testing the change in beta from the simple to multiple regression. Specif-
ically, the z for ab is as follows:
Z 
ab
b2sa2  a2sb2  sa2 sb2
where b is the standardized beta for the effect of the mediator on the
dependent variable when the independent variable (IV) is in the model, sb
is the standard error for b, a is the standardized beta obtained from
regressing the mediator on to the IV, and sa is the standard error for a. For
a more detailed exposition, see Kenny, Kashy, and Bolger (1998) or
consult the following websites: http://nw3.nai.net/dakenny/mediate
.htm and http://quantrm2.psy.ohio-state.edu/kris/sobel/sobel.htm.
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questionnaire contained 14 randomly ordered emotion adjectives (bounded
by the endpoints 1 not at all and 9 very much) that assessed daily level
of sadness, loneliness, subjective well-being, and anxiety. We averaged the
daily measures to form four psychological health indexes. We computed an
alpha for each index by collapsing the ratings for each emotional adjective
across days and then averaging the collapsed ratings.
We assessed sadness by asking participants to express each day the
degree to which they felt sad, gloomy, depressed, and blue. Scores ranged
from 4.0 to 9.0 (M  7.1;   .93). We assessed loneliness by asking
participants to rate each day the degree to which they felt alone, left out,
lonely, and isolated. Scores ranged from 3.4 to 9.0 (M 7.2;  .94). We
measured subjective well-being by asking participants to indicate each day
the extent to which they were delighted, happy, and joyful. Scores ranged
from 2 to 7 (M  6.6;   .91). Finally, we measured anxiety by asking
participants to rate each day the extent to which they felt frightened,
nervous, and worried. Scores ranged from 2 to 9 (M  6.9;   .87).
Results and Discussion
As in Study 1, we tested the hypothesis that self-esteem medi-
ates the relation between narcissism and psychological health. We
began by regressing self-esteem on narcissism. This relation was
significant (  .35, p  .01), a pattern that replicates Study 1.
Next, we regressed each psychological health index on narcissism.
Narcissism was inversely related to daily sadness (  –.24, p 
.04), unrelated to daily loneliness (  –.13, p  .25), positively
(albeit marginally) related to daily subjective well-being (  .19,
p  .10), and inversely (albeit marginally) related to daily anxiety
(  –.19, p  .10). As in Study 1, narcissism predicted psycho-
logical health.
We also regressed each psychological health index on self-
esteem. Replicating Study 1, self-esteem emerged as a predictor of
psychological health. Self-esteem was inversely related to daily
sadness (  –.41, p  .001) and daily loneliness (  –.45, p 
.001), positively related to daily subjective well-being (  .40,
p  .001), and inversely related to daily anxiety (  –.37, p 
.01).
Subsequently, we assessed through simultaneous regression
analyses whether the independent effects of narcissism on psycho-
logical health decreased when self-esteem was entered into the
model. We also calculated significance tests for the indirect (via
self-esteem) effects of narcissism on psychological health.
Self-esteem completely mediated the effect of narcissism on
daily sadness: When self-esteem was entered in the model ( 
–.38, p  .01), narcissism was unrelated to daily sadness ( 
–.11, p  .34). The indirect effect of narcissism on sadness was
significant (z  2.45, p  .05). Also, following inclusion of
self-esteem in the model (  –.47, p  .001), the relation
between narcissism and daily loneliness was weakened (  .04,
p  .74). Importantly, the indirect effect of narcissism on loneli-
ness was significant (z  2.69, p  .01). Furthermore, self-esteem
completely mediated the effect of narcissism on daily subjective
well-being: When self-esteem was entered in the model (  .38,
p  .01), narcissism was unrelated to daily subjective well-being
(  .05, p  .66). The indirect effect of narcissism on daily
subjective well-being was significant (z  2.46, p  .05). Finally,
self-esteem completely mediated the effect of narcissism on daily
anxiety: When self-esteem was entered in the model (  –.35,
p .01), narcissism was unrelated to daily anxiety ( –.06, p
.57). The indirect effect of narcissism on daily anxiety was signif-
icant (z  2.34, p  .05).
Replicating Study 1, the results support the contention that
self-esteem mediates the link between narcissism and psycholog-
ical health.2 Moreover, our time-lagged design allows us to infer
that narcissism predicts subsequent psychological health and that
this relation is mediated by self-esteem.
Study 3
The objective of Study 3 was to further enlarge the scope of our
investigation. First, Study 3 sought to generalize the findings of the
previous studies to a community sample. Second, and more im-
portant, Study 3 used not only subjective but also couple well-
being as an indicator of psychological health. Couple, and in
particular marital, well-being is an important correlate of subjec-
tive well-being (Argyle, 1987; A. Campbell, Converse, & Rodgers,
1976; W. K. Campbell, Sedikides, & Bosson, 1994; Myers &
Diener, 1995). Specifically, marriage quality is a potent predictor
of subjective well-being, accounting for approximately 50% of the
variance (Russell & Wells, 1994). This relation is observed across
cultures, as it has been found to be statistically significant in 16 of
17 countries (Stack & Eshleman, 1998). Additionally, problems in
marital or close relationships are linked to negative emotions
(Kitson & Morgan, 1990) and depression (Berscheid & Reis,
1998).
Although high narcissists prefer a ludic love style and manifest
low commitment in dating relationships, they seem to satisfy their
(however low) intimacy needs by selecting or marrying admiring
partners (W. K. Campbell, 1999; W. K. Campbell & Foster, 2002;
W. K. Campbell, Foster, & Finkel, 2002). Within the confines of
such a relationship, high narcissists may experience relatively high
couple well-being. We test this notion and examine whether nar-
cissistic couple well-being is mediated by self-esteem.
Method
Participants and Recruitment
Participants were 79 married couples who took part in Time 1 activities
of a three-phase longitudinal study of marital relations.3 Participants were
recruited through notices posted around campus and in the community as
well as through advertisements in local newspapers. Announcements
briefly described the project, indicated that the study involved three re-
search sessions over an 8-month period, noted that couples would be paid
$50 for taking part in each session, and provided contact information.
When couples contacted us, we provided further information about project
activities, determined whether couples wished to take part, and scheduled
appointments for Time 1 sessions.
2 We also examined the correlations between narcissism or self-esteem
and psychological health variability, operationalized in terms of the stan-
dard deviation for each psychological health index. Narcissism was uncor-
related with psychological health variability. Note that Rhodewalt et al.
(1998) found that, over a period of several days, narcissists reported greater
variability than nonnarcissists on positive mood and mood intensity. Ad-
ditional research will need to test whether the different emotion indexes
used were responsible for this conceptual discrepancy. In contrast to
narcissism, self-esteem was related to two indexes of psychological health
variability: sadness (r  –.21, p  .10) and anxiety (r  –.25, p  .05).
3 We excluded data from (a) 2 couples who failed to follow question-
naire instructions and (b) 1 lesbian couple, given that our data analytic
strategy involved identifying a male and female partner in each marriage.
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Participants were 34.11 years old on average (34.87 for husbands, 33.36
for wives), the majority were Caucasian (81% Caucasian, 10% African
American, 4% Hispanic, 2% Asian American, 3% other), and the majority
had at least 4 years of college education (45% obtained advanced or
professional degrees, 37% completed 4 years of college, 10% completed 2
years of college, and 8% completed high school only). Their personal
annual salaries averaged about $25,000. Participants had been married to
one another for 6.05 years on average, and the majority did not have
children (73% no children, 11% one child, 8% two children, 8% more than
two children).
Procedure
Ten days prior to scheduled laboratory sessions, we mailed couples
questionnaires to be separately completed in advance and brought to the
session. These questionnaires included measures of narcissism, self-
esteem, and subjective well-being (along with other constructs that are
irrelevant to the objectives of the present study). On arrival at Time 1,
participants completed a questionnaire including measures of couple well-
being. Finally, couples were debriefed and paid.
Measures
Narcissism and self-esteem. Participants completed the NPI (range 
1–37; M 13.25;  .85) and the RSI (0 do not agree at all, 8 agree
completely; range  28–80; M  62.75;   .90).
Psychological health. We used two indexes of psychological health:
subjective well-being and couple well-being. We measured subjective
well-being with two scales: the SWLS (0  does not describe me at all,
8  describes me completely; range  0–8; M  5.41;   .90), and the
10-item A. Campbell et al.’s (1976) Scale (“Describe your present life by
circling a number for each of the following scales”; e.g., “boring–interest-
ing”; “disappointing–rewarding”; range  2–9 [on a 1–9 response scale];
M  6.72;   .88).
We operationalized couple well-being in terms of dyadic adjustment,
relationship commitment, and relationship satisfaction. We measured dy-
adic adjustment with Spanier’s (1976) 32-item Dyadic Adjustment Scale.
This scale assesses couple qualities such as affection (e.g., “Do you kiss
your partner?”; 0 never, 5 every day), intimacy (e.g., “Do you confide
in your mate?”), agreement (e.g., “Do you agree about ‘sex relations’?”),
and shared activities (e.g., “Do you and your mate engage in outside
interests together?”; range  44–146; M  113.88;   .94). We mea-
sured relationship commitment with a 15-item instrument modeled after
previous relevant research (Rusbult, Martz, & Agnew, 1998). Using a
9-point rating scale (0  do not agree at all, 8  agree completely),
participants responded to questions that assessed their intention to maintain
their relationship (e.g., “I am completely committed to maintaining our
marriage”; range  2–8; M  6.76;   .92). Finally, we measured
relationship satisfaction with five items (Rusbult, 1983; e.g., “I feel satis-
fied with our marriage”; 0  do not agree at all, 8  agree completely;
range  0–8; M  6.69;   .95).
Results and Discussion
We review our analyses in three sections. First, we describe
hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) and outline the specifics of
our analysis strategy. Second, we examine the associations of
narcissism and self-esteem to measures of psychological health.
Third, we test whether self-esteem mediates the relation between
narcissism and psychological health.
Data Analytic Strategy
Given that data provided by the two partners in a given rela-
tionship are not independent, we used HLM (Bryk & Raudenbush,
1992) to account for the nesting of data from partners within a
couple (Kenny, Kashy, & Bolger, 1998). This data analytic tech-
nique examines simultaneously within-couple and between-couple
variance, modeling each source of variation while accounting for
statistical characteristics of the other level. Predictors and criteria
are represented in our analyses as lower level variables; couple as
the upper level unit. HLM analyses estimate equations of the
following form:
Lower level model: Yij  0j  1jX  rij;
upper level intercept: 0j  00  u0j; and
upper level slope: 1j  10  u1j.
where X is a given predictor variable and Yij is the criterion score
for Person i in Couple j, rij is the error term for Person i in Couple
j, 00 is the average intercept across couples,  10 is the average
slope across couples, u0j is the unique intercept for Couple j, and
u1j is the unique slope for Couple j.
Initially, all conducted analyses represented both intercepts and
slopes as random effects. When tests examining the variance and
covariance components in these analyses revealed nonsignificant
across-couple differences in slopes, we recalculated models rep-
resenting slopes as fixed effects. Slopes were represented as ran-
dom effects in about 9% of the analyses (i.e., in analyses in which
significant across-couple differences were revealed) and as fixed
effects in the remaining analyses (i.e., in analyses in which across-
couple differences were nonsignificant). For all but one of the
analyses, we obtained an identical pattern of significance (or
marginality) versus nonsignificance whether intercepts and slopes
were represented as fixed or random effects. In the remaining
analysis, the representation of the slope as a random effect yielded
marginal findings instead of the significant association found with
representation of the slope as a fixed effect.
In testing a given hypothesis, we first calculated one-predictor
models, examining the association of a single predictor with a
single criterion. When a given hypothesis included two predictors
of a criterion, we also calculated two-predictor models in which we
regressed a single criterion simultaneously onto two predictor
variables. We performed preliminary analyses to explore possible
gender effects. All preliminary analyses included the main effect
of participant gender as well as the interaction of gender with each
predictor variable. A few analyses revealed main effects of gender,
and the inclusion of gender in the model changed the direct
association of two of the predictors with the criterion from mar-
ginal significance to nonsignificance. All other associations
yielded identical findings with or without gender in the model.
Therefore, we dropped participant gender from further analyses.
Psychological Health
Subjective well-being. First, we regressed self-esteem on nar-
cissism. This relation was significant (  .40, p  .001). Next,
we regressed subjective well-being on narcissism. Narcissism was
related positively to subjective well-being (SWLS:   .17, p 
.05; A. Campbell et al.’s [1976] Scale:   .28, p  .001).
Next, we regressed both narcissism and self-esteem on subjec-
tive well-being. When self-esteem was entered in the model,
narcissism was unrelated to subjective well-being (SWLS: .04,
p  .63; Campbell et al.’s [1976] Scale:   .11, p  .16). This
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result documents the mediational role of self-esteem, a replication
of our previous findings. Similarly, the effects of self-esteem
remained significant when entered in the model (SWLS:   .39,
p  .001; A. Campbell et al.’s [1976] Scale:   .42, p  .001).
Finally, self-esteem mediated the association between narcissism
and subjective well-being (SWLS: z 3.78, p .01; A. Campbell
et al.’s [1976] Scale: z  3.91, p  .01). In conclusion, mediation
by self-esteem was complete, in that narcissism did not account for
unique variance in subjective well-being beyond variance attrib-
utable to self-esteem.
Couple well-being. Next, we examined the mediational role of
self-esteem in the relation between narcissism and couple well-
being. First, we regressed each measure of couple well-being on
narcissism. Narcissism was positively related to all of the mea-
sures. Specifically, it was significantly associated with dyadic
adjustment (  .14, p  .05), relationship commitment (  .17,
p  .05), and relationship satisfaction (  .13, p  .05).
Subsequently, we regressed narcissism and self-esteem on each
measure of couple well-being. When self-esteem was entered in
the model, narcissism was not related to dyadic adjustment ( 
.07, p  .33), relationship commitment (  .08, p  .33), or
relationship satisfaction ( .05, p .45). These results establish
the mediational role of self-esteem. Further, the effects of self-
esteem remained significant when entered in the model for each
measure: dyadic adjustment (  .18, p  .01), relationship
commitment ( .23, p .01), and relationship satisfaction (
.22, p  .01). Finally, self-esteem mediated the association of
narcissism with all of the couple well-being measures: dyadic
adjustment (z  2.40, p  .05), relationship commitment (z 
2.56, p .05), and relationship satisfaction (z 2.91, p .05). In
summary, mediation by self-esteem was complete: Narcissism did
not account for unique variance in couple well-being beyond that
attributable to self-esteem.4
Caveats
The majority of the couples in our sample did not have children.
It is possible that narcissism exerts a toll on couple well-being only
when the demands of a family come into play. Also, our sample
consisted mainly of well-educated professionals. It is possible that
narcissism is a relatively tolerable, if not acceptable, trait among
young professionals, although the reverse hypothesis (i.e., narcis-
sism is a more undetected and tolerable trait among relatively
uneducated persons) is equally plausible. Nevertheless, we raise
these caveats as empirical questions for future research.
Study 4
There is a rival hypothesis to our findings so far. Arguably, the
relation between normal narcissism and psychological health is
due to a response bias. Narcissists provide positively biased re-
sponses, rating themselves favorably across the board.
We believe that this rival hypothesis has trouble accounting for
our findings. First, high narcissists do not have a monolithic
response bias, as they rate themselves negatively (compared with
low narcissists) on several traits. Specifically, they rate themselves
as exploitative, Machiavellian, angry, hostile, disagreeable, unem-
pathetic, and ungrateful (Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001; Sedikides et
al., 2002). Moreover, although high narcissists may rate them-
selves positively on traits that reflect intellectual ability, they do
not do so on traits that reflect morality or concern for others (W. K.
Campbell, Reeder, Sedikides, & Elliot, 2000; see also Paulhus &
John, 1998). Finally, Raskin et al. (1991) reported, in a single
study, that narcissism was uncorrelated with social desirability, as
measured by Edwards’s (1957) Scale. Nevertheless, a direct test of
the rival hypothesis is needed in the context of our investigation.
This was the objective of Study 4.
We assessed the response bias hypothesis in two ways. First, we
included the Marlowe–Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne
& Marlowe, 1960). Although this scale was designed as a measure
of desirable responding, its authors concluded that high-scoring
participants might be more appropriately labeled as defensive, as
they engage in self-protective behavior (Crowne, 1979; Crowne &
Marlowe, 1964). For example, high-scoring participants are in-
tensely afraid of rejection, are less likely to report justified feelings
of hostility and anger, and are more likely to change their privately
held attitudes as a function of dissonance induction. In summary,
use of the Marlowe–Crowne Scale allows us to test whether the
results of the previous three studies can be explained in terms of
defensive responding.
We also tested the response bias hypothesis by assessing levels
of psychological repression. Repressors are individuals who lead
their daily lives on an emotional plateau, defensively avoiding
peaks and troughs. They cope with negative life events with apathy
and restraint rather than emotional intensity or reactivity, shunning
negative affect or unwanted thoughts (Weinberger, 1990; Wein-
berger, Schwartz, & Davidson, 1979). We used Weinberger et al.’s
(1979) Repression Scale to identify a sample of repressors. These
authors regarded repressors as low on anxiety but high in defen-
siveness and devised a scale to reflect this psychological profile.
Weinberger et al.’s (1979) Repression Scale has been validated in
several investigations (Baumeister & Cairns, 1992; Boden &
Baumeister, 1997; Davis, 1987; Hansen & Hansen, 1988).
Method
Participants and Procedure
Participants were 154 (105 women, 49 men) UNC-CH undergraduate
students, volunteering for introductory psychology course credit.
Measures
Participants filled out the repression scale and the same packet of
questionnaires as in Study 1.
Defensiveness. Participants completed the 33-item Marlowe–Crowne
Social Desirability Scale. Scores range from 0 to 33, with higher scores
reflecting greater social desirability (i.e., defensiveness). In our study,
scores ranged from 1 to 28 (M  14.6,   .78).
Repression. Participants completed Weinberger et al.’s (1979) Repres-
sion Scale. First, they filled out the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale (Bendig,
4 We wondered whether narcissists are conducive to their partners’ poor
psychological health. This notion did not receive substantive empirical
support. The partner’s dyadic adjustment (  –.04, p  .47), relationship
commitment (  .02, p  .76), relationship satisfaction (  –.03, p 
.67), and, in part, subjective well-being (SWLS:   .09, p  .22) were
unaffected. Only the partner’s subjective well-being, as assessed by the A.
Campbell, Converse, and Rodgers (1976) Scale (  –.19, p  .05), was
influenced negatively by the narcissistic companion. In all, a narcissist is
not dangerous to the partner’s health.
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1956). This scale consists of 27 items that measure affective, cognitive, and
behavioral components of social anxiety. Scores range from 0 to 27, with
higher scores reflecting greater social anxiety. In our study, scores ranged
from 7 to 25 (M  9.4,   .81). Second, as mentioned previously,
participants completed the Marlowe–Crowne Social Desirability Scale. In
line with past research (Baumeister & Cairns, 1992; Boden & Baumeister,
1997), we classified as repressors those participants who scored in the
lowest quartile on the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale and those who scored
in the upper half on the Marlowe–Crowne Social Desirability Scale.
Twenty-five participants met these criteria and were considered repressors.
Narcissism and self-esteem. Participants completed the NPI (range 
4–39; M 17.13;  .85) and the RSI (1 do not agree at all, 7 agree
completely; range  29–70; M  57.97;   .85).
Depression. Participants completed the CES-D (range  1–52; M 
14.29;   .91) and the BDI (range  0–46; M  6.39;   .88).
Loneliness. Participants completed the UCLA-LS, Version 3 (range 
20–77; M  39.40;   .92) and the ESLS (range  10–42; M  20.04;
  .76). As in Study 1, the correlation between the ELS and SLS was
significant (r  .31, p  .05).
Subjective well-being. Participants completed the SWLS (range 
5–35; M  25.10;   .85) and the ABS (range  1–10; M  6.48;  
.50). Given the low alpha, we carried out separate analyses for each index
of subjective well-being and obtained virtually identical results.
Results and Discussion
To begin with, we examine whether the findings of this study
replicate those of the previous studies. We proceed with two waves
of analyses. First, we examine the rival hypothesis that our find-
ings are due to high levels of defensiveness among narcissists.
Second, we examine the rival hypothesis that our findings are due
to high levels of repression among narcissists.
Replication
We tested the hypothesis that self-esteem mediates the relation
between narcissism and psychological health. We regressed self-
esteem on narcissism. This relation was significant (  .35, p 
.01). Next, we regressed each psychological health index on nar-
cissism. Narcissism was inversely related to depression (CES-D:
  –.25, p  .01; BDI:   –.25, p  .01); was inversely, albeit
marginally, related to loneliness (UCLA-LS:   –.28, p  .08;
ESLS:   –.14, p  .10); and was positively, albeit in one case
marginally, related to subjective well-being (SWBS:   .14, p 
.09; ABS:   .31, p  .01). These findings are consistent with
those of Studies 1–3. Also consistent with our past findings,
self-esteem predicted psychological health, being inversely related
to both measures of depression (CES-D:  –.61, p .001; BDI:
  –.62, p  .001) and both measures of loneliness (UCLA-LS:
  –.59, p  .001; ESLS:   –.53, p  .001), as well as
positively related to both measures of subjective well-being
(SWBS:   .56, p  .001; ABS:   .56, p  .001).
Subsequently, we assessed whether the effects of narcissism on
psychological health decreased when self-esteem was entered in
the model. When self-esteem was included in the model (for
CES-D,   –.60, p  .001; for BDI,   –.61, p  .001),
narcissism was unrelated both to CES-D (  –.05, p  .49) and
to BDI (  –.05, p  .52). The indirect effects of narcissism on
CES-D (z  4.01, p  .001) and BDI (z  4.03, p  .001) were
significant: Self-esteem completely mediated the effect of narcis-
sism on depression.
Additionally, self-esteem completely mediated the effect of
narcissism on loneliness. When self-esteem was entered in the
model (for UCLA-LS,   –.56, p  .001; for ESLS,   –.56,
ps  .001), narcissism was unrelated both to the UCLA-LS ( 
–.09, p  .20) and to the ESLS (  .05, p  .48). Furthermore,
self-esteem significantly and fully mediated the relations between
narcissism and the UCLA-LS (z  3.93, p  .001) and between
narcissism and the ESLS (z  3.86, p  .001).
Also, self-esteem completely mediated the effect of narcissism
on subjective well-being. When self-esteem was entered in the
model (SWLS:   .58, p  .001; ABS:   .52, p  .001),
narcissism was unrelated to the SWLS (  –.06, p  .40) and
only marginally related to the ABS (  .12, p  .09). Further-
more, self-esteem significantly mediated the association between
narcissism and the SWLS (z  3.94, p  .001) and between
narcissism and the ABS (z  3.83, p  .001).
Rival Hypothesis I: Defensiveness
Our next wave of analyses tested the rival hypothesis that the
above-mentioned findings are due to narcissistic defensiveness.
The potential for defensiveness to complicate our mediational
analyses was evident: Defensiveness correlated significantly both
with self-esteem (r  .29, p  .0001) and with every index of
psychological health except the BDI (UCLA-LS: r  –.23, p 
.001; ESLS: r –.18, p .05; ABS: r .321, p .0001; SWLS:
r .254, p .001; CES-D: r –.20, p .01; BDI: r –.11, p
.20). It did not, however, correlate with narcissism directly (r 
–.13, p  .11).
First, we examined whether defensiveness mediates the relations
between narcissism and psychological health. When defensiveness
was entered in the model, narcissism continued to predict scores on
depression (CES-D:  –.29, p .001; BDI:  –.27, p .01),
loneliness (UCLA-LS:   –.32, p  .001; ESLS:   –.16, p 
.05), and subjective well-being (SWLS:   .18, p  .03; ABS:
  .35, p  .001). Defensiveness did not mediate the relations
between narcissism and psychological health.
Moreover, controlling for defensiveness, self-esteem continued
to mediate the relations between narcissism and psychological
health. First, when self-esteem was entered in the model (for
CES-D,   –.58, p  .001; for BDI,   –.63, p  .001),
narcissism was unrelated both to CES-D (  –.06, p  .40) and
to BDI (  –.03, p  .70). The indirect effects of narcissism on
CES-D (z  4.44, p  .001) and BDI (z  4.56, p  .001) were
significant, indicating that self-esteem completely mediated the
effect of narcissism on depression. Second, when self-esteem was
entered in the model (for UCLA-LS,   –.52, p  .001; for
ESLS,   –.54, ps  .001), narcissism was unrelated both to the
UCLA-LS ( –.12, p .11) and to the ESLS ( .05, p .54).
Furthermore, self-esteem significantly and fully mediated the re-
lations between narcissism and the UCLA-LS (z 4.24, p .001)
and between narcissism and the ESLS (z 4.23, p .001). Third,
when self-esteem was entered in the model (SWLS:   .54, p 
.001; ABS:   .44, p  .001), narcissism was unrelated to the
SWLS (  –.03, p  .66) but related to the ABS (  .18, p 
.02). Furthermore, self-esteem mediated the relation between nar-
cissism and the SWLS (z  4.33, p  .001) and between narcis-
sism and the ABS (z  3.95, p  .001). In summary, there is no
evidence for the rival hypothesis that the results are due to narcis-
sistic defensiveness.
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Rival Hypothesis II: Repression
Our final wave of analyses tested the rival hypothesis that the
findings are due to correlated levels of repression. Again, the
potential for repression to complicate our mediational analyses
was evident: Repression, dichotomously scored, correlated signif-
icantly with self-esteem (r .32, p .0001), as well as with every
index of psychological health (UCLA-LS: r  –.34, p  .0001;
ESLS: r –.19, p .02; ABS: r .28, p .001; SWLS: r .24,
p .003; CES-D: r –.32, p .0001; BDI: r –.29, p .0001).
It did not, however, correlate with narcissism directly (r  .07,
p  .38).
We began by examining whether repression mediates the rela-
tions between narcissism and psychological health. When control-
ling for the effects of repression, narcissism was inversely related
to depression (CES-D:   –.24, p  .001; BDI:   –.24, p 
.001) and to loneliness (UCLA-LS:   –.27, p  .001; ESLS:
  –.13, p  .12) and was positively related to subjective
well-being (SWLS:   .13, p  .11; ABS:   .20, p  .001).
Repression did not mediate the relations between narcissism and
psychological health.
Furthermore, controlling for repression, self-esteem continued
to mediate the relations between narcissism and psychological
health. First, when self-esteem was entered in the model (CES-D:
  –.56, p  .001 BDI:   –.58, p  .001), narcissism was
unrelated both to CES-D (  –.05, p  .45) and to BDI ( 
–.05, p  .48). The indirect effects of narcissism on CES-D (z 
3.89, p  .001) and BDI (z  3.92, p  .001) were significant,
indicating that self-esteem completely mediated the effect of nar-
cissism on depression. Second, when self-esteem was entered in
the model (  –.52, p  .001, for the UCLA-LS;   –.54, p 
.001, for the ESLS), narcissism was unrelated both to the
UCLA-LS ( –.10, p .17) and to the ESLS ( .05, p .49).
Furthermore, self-esteem significantly and fully mediated the re-
lations between narcissism and the UCLA-LS (z 3.79, p .001)
and between narcissism and the ESLS (z  3.77, p  .001).
Finally, when self-esteem was entered in the model (SWLS:  
.57, p  .001;   .49, p  .001), narcissism was unrelated to the
SWLS ( –.06, p .42) but marginally related to the ABS (
.13, p  .09). Furthermore, self-esteem mediated the relation
between narcissism and the SWLS (z  3.85, p  .001) and
between narcissism and the ABS (z  3.70, p  .001). In sum-
mary, there is no evidence for the rival hypothesis that the results
are explicable in terms of repression.
Study 5
The aim of Study 5 was to replicate and extend the findings of
the previous studies, thereby further bolstering our claim that
self-esteem fully mediates the link between narcissism and psy-
chological health and does so independently of response bias. As
before, we used four key indexes of psychological health: depres-
sion, loneliness, subjective well-being, and anxiety. In addition, we
used a new index of psychological health: neuroticism. This index
reflects the dispositional tendency to experience negative affect
(John, 1990) and is inversely related to successful coping and good
psychological adjustment (Costa & McCrae, 1987; McCrae &
John, 1992; Stoeber, 2003). We also used alternative indexes of
depression and anxiety.
Furthermore, we used two additional self-esteem indexes. One
was a global trait self-esteem index (Pliner et al., 1990). The other
distinguished between self-competence derived esteem and self-
liking derived esteem (Tafarodi & Swann, 1995). The inclusion of
the latter scale allowed us to test the possibility that narcissistic
esteem is based to a disproportionate degree on self-competence. If
so, then competence-based, compared with liking-based, esteem
should emerge as a more potent mediator of the link between
narcissism and health.
Finally, we included an alternative measure of response bias—
impression management—to test whether self-esteem would continue
to mediate fully the link between narcissism and psychological health
even when the tendency to “fake good” was taken into account.
Method
Participants
Participants were 155 (131 women, 24 men) University of Southampton
undergraduate students, volunteering in exchange for course credit. Most
participants described themselves as Caucasian (85%) and British (91%).
Recruitment and Procedure
The study was run entirely on computer. Participants signed up by
e-mailing a research assistant (RA) after reading a posted ad. The RA
replied, providing participants with an identification number and password
and directing them to a Web site from which to download the program that
ran the study. This program took the form of a stand-alone .exe file created
by Aiden P. Gregg. Participants completed each study session either on
their own computer or on a publicly available machine. They were urged
to begin each session only if they felt confident that they would remain free
from distraction. When each session ended, the program stored partici-
pants’ data as a coded .rtf file on the C:/ drive of their computer. Partici-
pants promptly returned each stored data file to the RA by e-mail attach-
ment. In total, six sessions were run, each on a different day. The data for
the current study are derived from a subset of the measures administered
during Sessions 1, 2, and 4. Twenty participants had data deleted from at
least one measure because they (a) responded with suspicious haste or
tardiness (6 or more responses lasting less than 1,000 ms or more than
15,000 ms on any one measure) or (b) furnished suspiciously extreme
scores (scores less than the 25th percentile or greater than the 75th
percentile by a margin of three times the interquartile range). Sample sizes
in various analyses varied from 131 to 151.
Measures
Unless otherwise indicated, all questionnaires (a) were administered
during Session 1 and (b) featured 7-point scales (1 not at all like me, 7
very much like me) to which participants responded by clicking on the
appropriate digit.
Narcissism. Participants completed the NPI (range  2–32; M  11.50;
  .82). The forced-choice format was duplicated by having participants
click on one of two buttons for Option A or Option B.
Self-esteem. Participants completed two different measures during
Session 2 and again during Session 4 at least 1 week later. The first
measure was the RSI. Participants responded to each RSI item using a
vertical 4-point scale featuring clickable buttons (from the top: strongly
agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree). The data obtained during Ses-
sions 2 and 4 (RSI-A, RSI-B, respectively) were descriptively similar
(ranges  14–40 and 13–40; Ms  29.07 and 29.25; s  .91 and .93,
respectively) and remained consistent over a period of at least 8 days
(rRSI  .89).
The second measure was the Fear of Inadequacy Scale (FIS; Janis &
Field, 1959; revised by Fleming & Courtney, 1984). The original 36-item
inventory measured global self-esteem aggregated across five specific
subscales: Self-Regard, Social Anxiety, Academic Self-Esteem, Physical
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Attractiveness, and Physical Prowess. A further 6-item Body Esteem
subscale was appended (Pliner et al., 1990) to yield a 42-item scale. For
most items, the same pair of contrasting adjectives spanned the 7-point
semantic differential (1  never, 7  always), though idiosyncrasies of
item wording necessitated an occasional variation (e.g., 1  not at all, 7 
always). Scores were reversed so that higher scores denoted greater self-
esteem. A sample item is “do you ever think that you are a worthless
individual?” The data obtained during Sessions 2 and 4 (FIS-A, FIS-B,
respectively) were descriptively similar (ranges  12–55 and 14–62; Ms
 39.58 and 39.96; s  .96 and .96, respectively) and remained consis-
tent over a period of at least 8 days (rRSI  .96).
Participants also completed a further measure of self-esteem during
Session 1, the Self-Liking/Self-Competence Scale (SLCS; Tafarodi &
Swann, 1995). Balanced for positively and negatively worded items, the
questionnaire contained two 10-item subscales, one assessing self-liking
(S-L; range  13–68; M  43.97;   .95), the other assessing self-
competence (S-C; range 18–70; M  51.11;   .92). Sample items are
“I like myself” (S-L) and “I am talented” (S-C).
Depression and anxiety. Participants completed the Hospital Anxiety
and Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1982). The HADS
contained two seven-item subscales, one assessing depression (DEP;
range  7–22; M  10.56;   .71), the other assessing anxiety (ANX;
range  8–28; M  15.31;   .83). Every item was accompanied by an
idiosyncratically worded vertical 4-point scale featuring clickable buttons.
Sample items are “I feel cheerful” (DEP—reverse scored) and “I feel tense
or wound up” (ANX).
Loneliness. Participants completed the UCLA-LS, Version 3 (range 
27–68; M  42.00;   .92).
Subjective well-being. Participants completed the SWLS (range 
5–35; M  22.08;   .86).
Neuroticism. Participants completed the 8-item Neuroticism subscale
(NEU; range  9–39; M  25.23;   .87) from the 44-item Big Five
Inventory (Benet-Martinez & John, 1998). Participants responded to each
item using a vertical 5-point scale featuring clickable buttons (from top:
strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree, strongly disagree). A sample item
is “I see myself as someone who can be moody.”
Impression management. Participants completed the 20-item Impres-
sion Management subscale (range  35–106; M  68.91;   .76) of the
Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding, Version 7 (Paulhus, 1991). A
sample item (reversed) is “I never cover up my mistakes.”
Results and Discussion
First, we tested whether Study 5 replicated the findings of
previous studies (i.e., indicated that self-esteem fully mediates the
link between narcissism and psychological health). Second, we
tested whether these findings could be alternatively explained in
terms of impression management.
Replication
We began by separately regressing each of the six indexes of
self-esteem (RSI-A, RSI-B, FIS-A, FIS-B, S-L, S-C) on narcis-
sism. All indexes proved to be significant predictors (.44   
.61, all ps  .001).
Next, we separately regressed each psychological health index
on narcissism. As in previous studies, narcissism was inversely
related to depression (DEP:   –.23, p  .01), to anxiety (ANX:
  –.33, p  .001), and to loneliness (UCLA-LS:   –.37, p 
.001). Narcissism was also positively related to subjective well-
being (SWLS:   .31, p  .001). In addition, narcissism was
inversely related to the new index of (poor) psychological health,
neuroticism (NEU:   –.36, p  .001).
For completeness, we also separately regressed each psycholog-
ical health index on each of the six indexes of self-esteem. Sig-
nificant relations (all ps  .001) emerged in all cases (DEP:
–.43  –.49; ANX: –.52  –.66; UCLA-LS: –.48 
–.58; SWLS: .45    .59; NEU: –.54    –.73).
Next, we investigated whether the effect of narcissism on psy-
chological health was mediated by self-esteem by testing whether,
in a series of simultaneous regressions, the inclusion of each
self-esteem index entirely eliminated or significantly reduced the
capacity of narcissism to predict each psychological health index.
When each psychological index was, in turn, simultaneously
regressed on narcissism and accompanied by each self-esteem
index in turn, the predictive power of self-esteem always remained
robust, whereas the predictive power of narcissism always dramat-
ically declined. Specifically, for each psychological health index,
every self-esteem coefficient remained significant (all ps  .001)
in every competitive model (DEP: –.43  –.53; ANX: –.49
  –.65; UCLA-LS: –.42    –.54; SWLS: .43    .58;
NEU: –.50    –.71), whereas every narcissism coefficient
became nonsignificant (DEP: –.02    .13; ANX: –.06   
.10; UCLA-LS: –.14    –.06; SWLS: –.05    .05; NEU:
–.09    .05).
Finally, self-esteem mediated fully the relations between nar-
cissism and each health index (all ps .0001), regardless of which
index of self-esteem served as mediator (DEP: 4.99  z 
4.22; ANX: 6.24  z  4.77; UCLA-LS: 4.49  z 
3.66; SWLS: 4.05  z  6.05; NEU: 5.42  z  4.31).
Rival Hypothesis III: Impression Management
We once again tested whether the link between narcissism and
psychological health, and the role of self-esteem in mediating that
link, could be put down to a general positive response bias—on
this occasion, the tendency to provide socially desirable answers to
inquiries about oneself. Such a bias, we reasoned, might artificially
inflate correlations between our three key indexes: People keen to
portray themselves positively might endorse items indicative of
psychosocial success on all three indexes, whereas people uncon-
cerned about portraying themselves positively might fail to do so.
The finding, this time, of a significant zero-order correlation
between our index of narcissism and impression management (r
–.23, p  .005) suggests that impression management might well
play a role in accounting for our mediational findings.
Our data analytic strategy, therefore, was to rerun the regres-
sions described above, only this time including, at each stage, our
impression management index as a predictor variable. If socially
desirable responding accounted, in whole or in part, for the self-
esteem mediated link between narcissism and psychological
health, then the strength and significance of findings previously
obtained would be decisively attenuated.
So, with impression management included in the model, we
began by separately regressing each of six indexes of self-esteem
(RSI-A, RSI-B, FIS-A, FIS-B, S-L, S-C) on narcissism. All in-
dexes remained significant predictors (.47    .65, all ps 
.001). Indeed, if anything, impression management served as a
mild suppressor variable. Impression management itself was not
significantly related to any self-esteem index.
Next, with impression management again included in the model,
we separately regressed each psychological health index on nar-
cissism. Narcissism remained inversely related to depression
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(DEP:   –.25, p  .01), anxiety (ANX:   –.35, p  .001),
loneliness (UCLA-LS:   –.37, p  .001), and neuroticism
(NEU:   –.21, p  .05). In addition, narcissism remained
positively related to subjective well-being (SWLS:   .35, p 
.001). Although impression management showed no significant
zero-order correlations with any index of psychological health, it
did weakly predict subjective well-being (SWLS:   .20, p 
.05) in these regressions.
For completeness, we also separately regressed each psycholog-
ical health index on each of the six indexes of self-esteem, again
including impression management in each model. Significant re-
lations (all ps  .001) emerged in all cases (DEP: –.43   
–.49; ANX: –.52    –.66; UCLA-LS: –.48    –.57;
SWLS: .45    .59; NEU: –.54    –.73). Here, impression
management was consistently unrelated to all psychological health
indexes (–.08    .07) with the exception of subjective well-
being, which it significantly predicted in tandem with FIS-B ( 
.16, p  .03) and S-C (  .14, p  .05) and marginally predicted
in tandem with the four remaining self-esteem indexes (.13   
.11; .06  p  .13).
Crucially, we also tested whether, in a series of simultaneous
regressions, the inclusion of each self-esteem index eliminated or
reduced the capacity of narcissism to predict each psychological
health index when impression management also served as a pre-
dictor variable.
As before, self-esteem’s contribution to each model persisted,
whereas narcissism’s contribution dwindled (with one exception).
Specifically, for each psychological health index, every self-
esteem coefficient remained significant (all ps  .001) in the
competitive model (DEP: –.43    –.53; ANX: –.48   
–.65; UCLA-LS: –.42    –.54; SWLS: .41    .56; NEU:
–.48    –.69), whereas every narcissism coefficient (but one)
became nonsignificant (DEP: –.03    .11; ANX: –.07   
.10; UCLA-LS: –.12    –.06; SWLS: .01    .10; NEU:
–.13    .03). Once more, impression management was con-
sistently unrelated to all psychological health indexes (–.13 
.05) with the exception of subjective well-being, which it weakly
but significantly predicted in tandem with RSI-B (  .16, p 
.03), FIS-B (  .17, p  .03), and S-C (  .15, p  .03) and
marginally predicted in tandem with the three remaining self-
esteem indexes (.12    .14; .06  p  .08).
Finally, self-esteem mediated completely the relations between
narcissism and each health index (all ps  .0001), regardless of
which index of self-esteem served as mediator (DEP:4.96 z
4.14; ANX: 6.27  z  4.74; UCLA-LS: 3.68  z 
4.55; SWLS: 3.99  z  6.05; NEU: 5.57  z  4.32).
In summary, Study 5 replicated and extended the finding of
previous studies that self-esteem mediated the link between nar-
cissism and psychological health and obtained no evidence that
this finding could be alternatively explained in terms of impression
management. Additionally, the study obtained no evidence that
narcissistic self-esteem is based more on self-competence than
self-liking.
Dangerous Curves?
All the bivariate associations and mediational analyses reported
so far have assumed that narcissism, self-esteem, and psycholog-
ical health are linearly related. However, if the relations between
them do depart significantly from linearity, then our interpretation
of our results so far might merit revision or qualification.
Suppose, for example, that across all our studies, the links
between narcissism and self-esteem and those between self-esteem
and psychological health were linear but that the links between
narcissism and psychological health were nonlinear. If so, we
would have consistently underestimated the true association be-
tween narcissism and psychological health and, thereby, overesti-
mated the role of self-esteem in mediating that association by
focusing only on linear components. This would then have biased
our analysis in favor of confirming our central hypothesis. (The
neglect of other patterns of nonlinearity, though not as damaging
to our conclusions, would nonetheless have rendered inexact our
interpretations of mediation.) Moreover, even at a purely descrip-
tive level, it is obviously important to characterize properly any
nonlinearity obtaining between narcissism, self-esteem, and psy-
chological health because such nonlinearity would contain valu-
able supplementary information. For example, suppose that the
positive relation between narcissism and psychological health was
not only significantly linear but also significantly quadratic and
decelerating. This would imply that the positive link between
narcissism and psychological health decreases as narcissism in-
creases, that is, that the positive link between narcissism and
psychological health is more pronounced for persons lower in
narcissism.
Rather than report the level of linearity observed for every
association already reported—a service for which few readers
would forgive us—we instead present the results of analyses
conducted on aggregate data across studies. Not only do such
analyses allow us to address the issue of linearity more briskly, but
they also permit us to run more powerful statistical tests.5
Our five studies did not overlap perfectly in the measures that
they used and, when they did, sometimes featured different re-
sponse scales. We therefore rescaled all of our measures along a
common metric (0–100) before assembling three aggregate data-
sets that featured selected indexes of psychological health. In
particular, we collated data from Studies 1, 3, 4, and 5 on subjec-
tive well-being (SWLS),6 from Studies 1, 4, and 5 on loneliness
(UCLA-LS), and from Studies 1 and 4 on depression (BDI and
CES-D). Each of these three aggregate datasets included corre-
sponding scores for narcissism (NPI) and self-esteem (RSI),7
available across all five studies.8
5 The substantive picture does not change whether or not levels of
linearity are assessed within or across studies. Further details are available
from the authors on request.
6 In Study 3, scores were analyzed individually, without regard to couple
status. However, because no significant correlations emerged between
members of the same couples on indexes of interest (rRSI  .07, p  .57;
rNPI .13, p .26; rSWLS .20, p .08) the assumption of independence
of observations appears tenable.
7 The two measures of RSI data obtained in Study 5 were averaged to
provide a single measure.
8 Preliminary analyses revealed considerable homogeneity across all five
studies in the to-be-aggregated indexes. First, the standard deviations of
each index were highly comparable across all five studies. Second, the
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Following data transformations aimed at minimizing collinear-
ity,9 we arrived, across different samples, at independent estimates
of the linear and quadratic association between (a) narcissism
(NPI) and self-esteem (RSI), (b) narcissism (NPI) and each of the
four indexes of psychological health (SWLS, UCLA-LS, BDI, and
CES-D), and (c) self-esteem (RSI) and each of the four indexes of
psychological health (SWLS, UCLA-LS, BDI, and CES-D). The
results are summarized in Tables 1, 2, and 3. The tables feature
standardized coefficients representing the independent linear and
quadratic components of the relations of interest. Such components
can be computed by treating either variable in the relation as the
predictor or criterion (e.g., NPI could be regressed on RSI and its
quadratic product RSI2 or RSI could be regressed on NPI and its
quadratic product NPI2). The results of both types of computation
are presented.
Unsurprisingly, substantial and highly significant linear rela-
tions emerged (all ps  .0001) between (a) narcissism and self-
esteem, (b) narcissism and psychological health, and (c) self-
esteem and psychological health. However, no unequivocal
evidence was found of additional quadratic relations. Despite
sporadically attaining significance,10 none of the quadratic coeffi-
cients ever exceeded .11 in absolute magnitude. (Note that this
represents approximately 1% of the variance, whereas linear rela-
tions accounted for between 4% and 34% of the variance across
different analyses.)11 We conclude that relations among our key
constructs are adequately captured by a linear model, and that the
conclusions of our correlational and mediational analyses do not
require revision.
General Discussion
The current investigation had several objectives. The first ob-
jective was to provide a compelling empirical account for the
previously obtained weak link between normal narcissism and
psychological health. Specifically, past research had reported an
inverse relation between narcissism and depression (Watson &
Biderman, 1993; Wink, 1992), narcissism and anxiety (Watson &
Biderman, 1993), and narcissism and subjective well-being (Rose,
2002). Additionally, one study had reported a null finding regard-
ing the association between narcissism and loneliness (Joubert,
1986), whereas, to our knowledge, no prior research had examined
the relations between narcissism and neuroticism.
To this end, we conducted five studies. In Study 1, participants
completed one-time measures of narcissism, self-esteem, and psy-
chological health (i.e., depression, loneliness, and subjective well-
being). In Study 2, they completed one-time measures of narcis-
sism and self-esteem and subsequently reported their daily level of
psychological health (i.e., sadness, loneliness, subjective well-
being, and anxiety) for five consecutive days. In Study 3, partic-
ipants completed one-time measures of narcissism, self-esteem,
and psychological health (i.e., subjective well-being, and couple
well-being). In Study 4, they completed one-time measures of
repression, narcissism, self-esteem, and psychological health (i.e.,
depression, loneliness, and subjective well-being). Finally, in
Study 5, participants completed one-time measures of narcissism
and psychological health (i.e., depression, loneliness, subjective
well-being, anxiety, and neuroticism), as well as repeated mea-
sures of some self-esteem indexes.
9 To estimate the quadratic relation between a predictor and criterion
above and beyond any linear relation between them it is common practice
to center the predictor scores, manually compute their products, and then
regress the criterion scores on both the centered predictor scores and their
products. The centering eliminates any collinearity between the linear and
quadratic terms attributable to the metric in which they were originally
scaled (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). However, the skew of the
underlying distribution of predictor scores remains a potent source of
collinearity. Specifically, unless the predictor scores are symmetrically
distributed, their skew will inflate the size of the correlation between them
and their products. Consequently, the partial coefficients estimated in a
polynomial regression will vary depending on the skew of the original
predictor scores and, potentially, in complex ways (for example, if sup-
pression occurs). One awkward consequence is that the partial regression
coefficients estimated when the roles of predictor and criterion variables
are reversed will tend to differ more than they otherwise would, leading to
the uncomfortably contradictory conclusion that a quadratic relation be-
tween two variables, above and beyond any linear relation, both does and
does not exist, depending on how one looks at it. For example, in our
largest aggregate dataset (n 604), if NPI scores are regressed on centered
RSI scores and their products, then the quadratic beta is not significant
(  .02, t[602]  .51, p  .61), whereas if the centered RSI scores are
regressed on the NPI scores and their products, then the quadratic beta is
highly significant (  –.16, t[602]  4.5, p  .0001). Given that many
of our target variables were highly skewed (most people have high self-
esteem, are not depressed, etc.), we opted for a collinearity-reducing
strategy that yielded the most parsimonious result. Specifically, we non-
linearly transformed our variables to reduce their skew to zero (by selecting
the precise power function for the purpose; see McClelland, 2000; Mos-
teller & Tukey, 1977) and then linearly transformed them (to z scores) in
order to center their scores and equalize their highly discrepant variances.
Only then did we compute a set of products for each set of predictor scores.
Now the predictors and their products were fully orthogonal, making their
zero-order correlations with the criterion exactly equal to the beta weights
computed by regressing the criterion onto those predictors and products.
Hence, both the linear and quadratic coefficients we computed, whether
construed as correlations or betas, represent wholly independent compo-
nents of the relation between the variables. They are thus susceptible of
direct comparison.
10 That the quadratic coefficients are unequal in absolute magnitude
when the predictor and criterion are switched (one would expect the sign
of the quadratic term to reverse for limited curves) reflects the fact that the
product scores are skewed due to residual idiosyncracies in the parent
distribution of predictor scores. Because the skew of the product scores
varies depending on the idiosyncrasies of the predictor, and skew moder-
ates the magnitude of linear correlations, the correlations of the product
scores also depend on the idiosyncrasies of the predictor. Although the
skew of the product scores could be eliminated through transformation, this
would, in turn, be liable to create the very correlation between the predictor
scores that our analytic strategy attempted to remove.
11 Exploratory analyses confirmed that the same pattern was observed
for all subscales of the NPI, albeit in an attenuated form. Details are
available from the authors.
means for each index were highly comparable across Studies 1 through 4
(conducted in the United States), though they differed somewhat for Study
5 (conducted in the United Kingdom). In particular, on the basis of Tukey’s
HSD at p  .05, Study 5 participants were significantly lower in self-
esteem, narcissism, and subjective well-being (but not significantly higher
in loneliness) than were participants from the other studies. Nonetheless,
these differences were not considered sufficient to offset the informational
advantage gained by including Study 5 participants in the aggregate anal-
yses, especially given the comparable levels of dispersion across samples.
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These studies established that normal narcissism is (a) inversely
related to dispositional depression (Studies 1, 3–5) and daily
sadness (Study 2); (b) inversely related to dispositional loneliness
(Studies 1, 4, 5) and daily loneliness (Study 2); (c) positively
related to dispositional subjective well-being (Studies 1, 3–5),
daily subjective well-being (Study 2), and couple well-being
(Study 3); (d) inversely related to dispositional anxiety (Study 5)
and daily anxiety (Study 2); and (e) inversely related to disposi-
tional neuroticism (Study 5). The findings are thus consistent with
the emerging portrait of the high narcissist as a psychologically
healthy person (W. K. Campbell, 2001; Rose, 2002; Sedikides &
Gregg, 2001). Thus, high narcissists may be socially callous, but
that is no reason for them not to be psychologically healthy. To use
a far-fetched metaphor, the mind of a narcissist is like a sports
utility vehicle. It is great to be in the driving seat, but fellow
motorists must watch out, lest a collision with this mobile fortress
demolish their more humble hatchbacks.
High narcissists have elevated levels of self-esteem, and self-
esteem is a correlate of psychological health. We therefore hy-
pothesized that it is thanks to their elevated self-esteem that high
narcissists are relatively free of worry and gloom. This we duly
established. Self-esteem emerged consistently as a mediator of the
link between narcissism and psychological health, invariably ac-
counting for the impact of narcissism on depression, sadness,
loneliness, subjective well-being, couple well-being, anxiety, and
neuroticism. Thus, if normal narcissism is associated with psycho-
logical health benefits, this is due to its overlap with self-esteem.
Moreover, additional analyses indicated that the relations among
narcissism, self-esteem, and psychological health are predomi-
nantly linear.
High narcissists have been considered relatively high on agency
but low on communion (W. K. Campbell, Rudich, & Sedikides,
2002; Paulhus & John, 1998). This may have implications for the
narcissistic bases of self-esteem. That is, narcissistic self-esteem
may derive more from self-perceptions of competence than from
self-perceptions of likability. If so, then the self-competence di-
mension of narcissistic self-esteem should emerge as a more potent
mediator of the relation between narcissism and psychological
health than the self-liking dimension. This hypothesis was discred-
ited in a preliminary test (Study 5). Apparently, high narcissists
derive self-esteem by considering the self both very competent and
very likable. Both dimensions of self-esteem mediate the link
between narcissism and psychological health.
Can the results be accounted for simply by a response bias? Is
the reporting of good psychological health a symptom of a rigid,
positive, or socially desirable response bias on the part of narcis-
sists? Stated otherwise, can our findings be accounted for in terms
of high levels of narcissistic defensiveness, repression, or impres-
sion management? Studies 4 and 5 ruled out these hypotheses. Our
Table 1
Correlation Coefficients Representing the Independent Linear
and Quadratic Relations Between Self-Esteem and Normal
Narcissism in Three Aggregate Datasets Derived From the Five
Studies Reported
Variable
NPI1
(n1  604)
NPI2
(n2  450)
NPI3
(n3  302)
Predictor Criterion
RSI (linear) .447*** .473*** .339***
RSI (quadratic) .107* .110 .088
Criterion Predictor
RSI (linear) .447*** .473*** .339***
RSI (quadratic) .084* .083* .055
Note. Subscripts refer to partially overlapping aggregate datasets. Coef-
ficients represent beta weights from second-order polynomial regression
equations in which the criterion is regressed on a single predictor and its
product. Prior to computation of each product, all variables were first
nonlinearly transformed to eliminate skew and then z transformed to
eliminate collinearity due to scaling. Results are presented for each variable
alternately serving as predictor and criterion. NPI  Narcissistic Person-
ality Inventory; RSI  Rosenberg Self-Esteem Inventory.
* p  .05. *** p  .0001.
Table 2
Correlation Coefficients Representing the Independent Linear
and Quadratic Relations Between Self-Esteem and Four Indexes
of Psychological Health in Three Aggregate Datasets Derived
From the Five Studies Reported
Variable
SWLS
(n  604)
UCLA-LS
(n  450)
BDI
(n  302)
CES-D
(n  302)
Predictor Criterion
RSI (linear) .558*** .529*** .584*** .585***
RSI (quadratic) .089** .052 .103* .051
Criterion Predictor
RSI (linear) .558*** .529*** .584*** .585***
RSI (quadratic) .014 .014 .099* .020
Note. Coefficients represent beta weights from second-order polynomial
regression equations in which the criterion is regressed on a single predic-
tor and its product. Prior to computation of each product, all variables were
first nonlinearly transformed to eliminate skew and then z transformed to
eliminate collinearity due to scaling. Results are presented for each variable
alternately serving as predictor and criterion. SWLS  Satisfaction With
Life Scale; UCLA-LS UCLA Loneliness Scale; BDI Beck Depression
Inventory; CES-D Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale;
RSI  Rosenberg Self-Esteem Inventory.
* p  .05. ** p  .01. *** p  .0001.
Table 3
Correlation Coefficients Representing the Independent Linear
and Quadratic Relations Between Normal Narcissism and Four
Indexes of Psychological Health in Three Aggregate Datasets
Derived From the Five Studies Reported
Variable
SWLS
(n  604)
UCLA-LS
(n  450)
BDI
(n  302)
CES-D
(n  302)
Predictor Criterion
NPI (linear) .291*** .323*** .205*** .225***
NPI (quadratic) .068 .032 .089 .007
Criterion Predictor
NPI (linear) .291*** .323*** .205*** .225***
NPI (quadratic) .019 .011 .066 .044
Note. Coefficients represent beta weights from second-order polynomial
regression equations in which the criterion is regressed on a single predic-
tor and its product. Prior to computation of each product, all variables were
first nonlinearly transformed to eliminate skew and then z transformed to
eliminate collinearity due to scaling. Results are presented for each variable
alternately serving as predictor and criterion. SWLS  Satisfaction With
Life Scale; UCLA-LS UCLA Loneliness Scale; BDI Beck Depression
Inventory; CES-D Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale;
NPI  Narcissistic Personality Inventory.
*** p  .0001.
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results (i.e., the link between narcissism and psychological health,
and the mediational role of self-esteem) held even after controlling
for level of defensiveness, repression, or impression management.
Normal narcissism predicts psychological health, not a mere illu-
sory exaggeration of psychological health.
Nevertheless, given that the current investigation is the first to
address fully and directly the mediational role of self-esteem in the
link between normal narcissism and psychological health, the
findings ought to be subject to further verification. Although we
believe that self-reports have a place in psychological research,
especially when response biases are accounted for, we also believe
that additional measurements and procedures need to be recruited
and used in future relevant research. Are the obtained findings
replicated (a) with implicit measures of narcissism, self-esteem,
and psychological health, especially in longitudinal designs; (b) by
observer (in particular, close other) reports of narcissistic self-
esteem and psychological health; or (c) when narcissists are placed
under conditions of psychological threat? Finally, does the stability
(Kernis, 2003) or contingency (Crocker & Wolfe, 2001; Deci &
Ryan, 1995) of self-esteem mediate the relation between narcis-
sism and psychological health—a possibility consistent with the
finding that narcissists report relatively high self-esteem instability
(Rhodewalt, in press; Rhodewalt et al., 1998)?
The current investigation established that the self-esteem com-
ponent of normal narcissism accounts for the link between normal
narcissism and psychological health. However, self-esteem may
not account exclusively for that link. Future research needs to test
at least three other components of narcissism. The first is control:
High narcissists have an inflated sense of personal control over
their environment (Watson, Sawrie, & Biderman, 1991). The sec-
ond is power: Narcissism is associated with a heightened need for
status and power (Bradlee & Emmons, 1992; Carroll, 1987). The
third is achievement: High narcissists have high expectations for
themselves (Farwell & Wohlwend-Lloyd, 1998), and high self-
efficacy is linked with high need for achievement (Pajares, 1997).
Collectively, these empirical pursuits promise to clarify substan-
tially both the construct of narcissism and the component that is
most responsible for the good psychological health of high narcis-
sists. In fact, testing these likely components of narcissism would
clarify better the NPI per se. If anything, judging from the current
results, one is tempted to wonder whether the NPI captures a great
deal of variance over and above that associated with unusually
high self-esteem.
In conclusion, results from five studies, involving over 600
participants from two countries, disconfirmed the prevailing view
that high narcissists, given their interpersonal deficits, must suffer
ill psychological health. Although high narcissists are interperson-
ally exploitative and abrasive, they also are psychologically
healthy. Their good health is due, at least to a considerable degree,
to their elevated levels of self-esteem.
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New Editor Appointed for History of Psychology
The American Psychological Association announces the appointment of James H. Capshew, PhD,
as editor of History of Psychology for a 4-year term (2006–2009).
As of January 1, 2005, manuscripts should be submitted electronically via the journal’s Manuscript
Submission Portal (www.apa.org/journals/hop.html). Authors who are unable to do so should
correspond with the editor’s office about alternatives:
James H. Capshew, PhD
Associate Professor and Director of Graduate Studies
Department of History and Philosophy of Science
Goodbody Hall 130
Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405
Manuscript submission patterns make the precise date of completion of the 2005 volume uncertain.
The current editor, Michael M. Sokal, PhD, will receive and consider manuscripts through
December 31, 2004. Should the 2005 volume be completed before that date, manuscripts will be
redirected to the new editor for consideration in the 2006 volume.
416 SEDIKIDES, RUDICH, GREGG, KUMASHIRO, AND RUSBULT
